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Abstract
Following Galor and Zeira (1993), we study the effect of the world
interest rate on inequality and growth for the period 1985-2005, char-
acterized by falling world interest rates and cross-country income po-
larization. We argue that the two phenomena are related on the basis
of the following findings, which are in accordance with the predictions
of the Galor and Zeira model: 1) a reduction of the world interest rates
increases inequality in rich countries and decreases inequality in poor
countries; 2) inequality has a negative (and significant) effect on hu-
man capital accumulation in rich countries and a positive (but mostly
not significant) effect in poor countries; 3) human capital positively
affects GDP in both group of countries, in particular with a higher
marginal effect in poor countries. The overall effect of these facts is
polarization in the world income distribution.
Classificazione JEL: C33, O15, O16, O47
Keywords: Inequality, Human Capital, Economic Growth, Multiple
Equilibria, World Interest Rates
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I. Introduction
This paper is a contribution to the literature on income inequality
and economic growth (see Galor, 2011, for an exhaustive survey).
In particular, we study an aspect of the seminal model of Galor
and Zeira (1993) (GZ henceforth) not considered so far: the conse-
quences for within-country and cross-country income inequality of
a decrease in the world interest rate, when the main channel con-
necting inequality and growth is human capital accumulation. The
reduction of the world interest rate in the recent decades is a well-
documented fact related to the globalization of capital markets (see
e.g., Ahrend et al. 2006 and Desroches and Francis, 2010). However,
its relationship with within-country income inequality and with the
increase in the same period in world income polarization (see, e.g.
Quah, 1997) has not been studied so far.1
The insights on such relationships provided by the GZ model
are the following. Agents can invest in human capital at a fixed
cost. Given the decision to invest in human capital, agents can be
borrowers or lenders of funds, depending on the level of bequest
they receive. Credit markets are imperfect: the borrowers’ interest
rate is proportionally higher than lenders’ interest rate, given by
the world interest rate. The dynamics of the model, for a given
level of the world interest rate, features multiple equilibria in the
level of bequest. The world interest rate impacts on the income
of both borrowers and lenders: lenders are affected because their
income includes interests; borrowers, instead, are affected in their
capacity to invest in human capital and earn higher wages. The
resulting level of within-country inequality determines the share of
population investing in human capital, the level of production of
the economy and, ultimately, the degree of cross-country income
1Another strand of the literature, as for example Beaudry and Collard (2006), identifies
as the principal cause of the increase in income inequality across countries another aspect
of the process of globalization, i.e. the increase in international trade. The basic idea is
that capital-abundant countries specialize in high-capital/high-wage industries and therefore
disproportionately gain from globalization relative to poor countries that increase employment
in less capital-intensive industries.
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inequality.
With multiple equilibria, the initial conditions of the within-
country income distribution, i.e. its mean (determining if a country
is “poor” or “rich”), and its dispersion, are crucial for the long-run
dynamics. As shown by Galor (2011), in particular, inequality can
be “good for growth” in poor countries, as it allows some agents to
escape the the low-bequest equilibrium to invest in human capital,
but it can be “bad for growth” in rich countries, because agents out-
side the basin of attraction of the high-bequest equilibrium cannot
accumulate human capital. When the world interest rate changes,
therefore, it may have different effects in poor and rich countries.
In this paper we test the empirical predictions of the GZ model
on a large sample of countries for the period 1985-2005, a period
characterized by falling world interest rate and cross-country income
polarization. The main contributions of the paper are the following.
On the theoretical side, we demonstrate that when the world in-
terest rate is sufficiently high, the GZ model features one globally
stable equilibrium, but when the world interest rate decreases, mul-
tiple equilibria appear. On the empirical side we show that: 1) a
reduction of the world interest rates has a different impact on in-
equality in rich and poor countries: it increases inequality in rich
countries, and reduces inequality in poor countries; 2) inequality
has a different impact on the accumulation of human capital (specif-
ically in the form of tertiary education) in rich and poor countries.
In particular, inequality has a negative and significant effect on
human capital accumulation in rich countries, and a positive (but
mostly not significant) effect in poor countries. Overall, in the pe-
riod we study, inequality reduced human capital accumulation in
both group of countries below their potential. We show that the
net effect is, however, nonconvergence in human capital between
the groups. 3) Human capital has positive effect on GDP in both
rich and poor countries, but its marginal effect is much higher in
poor countries. This supports the claim that the lack of convergence
in human capital contributes to the observed lack of convergence in
per capita GDP. This facts are in line with the predictions of the
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GZ model.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II. we discuss the
existing literature on growth and income distribution; in Section
III. we summarize the GZ model and show how a decrease in the
world interest rates may cause the appearance of multiple equilib-
ria, and how this can have asymmetric effects on inequality de-
pending on the initial distribution of income. In Section IV. we
present the empirical analysis: a set of stylized fact on world inter-
est rates, within-country and cross-country inequality for the period
1985-2005 (Section IV.A.), and the econometric analysis of the re-
lationships of interest (Section IV.B.); in Section V. we consider an
alternative channel that may explain our stylized facts based on the
“directed technical change” hypothesis (Acemoglu, 2002); Section
VI. concludes.
II. Related Literature
The relationship between inequality and economic growth has
been analyzed by a large body of literature. The classical approach,
based on the Kaldor (1955)’s assumption that the marginal propen-
sity to save of the rich is higher than that of the poor, suggests that
inequality is growth-enhancing since it positively affects aggregate
savings and therefore physical capital accumulation (Stiglitz, 1969,
Bourguignon, 1981).
In the last two decades, the view that inequality is growth-
enhancing has been challenged by a a number of theoretical and
empirical studies. In particular the literature which emerged since
the nineties can be classified into two broad approaches: the credit
market imperfection approach and the political economy approach
(see Galor, 2011).
The Galor and Zeira (1993) article is the seminal contribution of
the first approach. In particular, Galor and Zeira (1993) develop a
model based on two fundamental assumptions: i) the presence of
credit market imperfections, so that the borrowing interest rate is
higher than the lending interest rate for agents wishing to borrow
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to invest in human capital, ii) the existence of fixed costs associated
to investment in education. These assumptions imply a multiple
equilibria dynamics in which the initial distribution of income can
affect the level of investment in human capital, the level of skilled
and unskilled labor of the economy and aggregate output. In this
setting, as noted: “inequality in the distribution of income may
have an adverse effect on the growth process in a non-poor econ-
omy, whereas inequality may have a beneficial effect on the growth
process in poor economies” (Galor, 2011, p. 19)
The Galor and Zeira paper has given rise to a vast literature, as
for example Banerjee and Newman (1993), Benabou (1996), Durlauf
(1996), Piketty (1997), Maoz and Moav (1999) and Mookherjee and
Ray (2003), which based their models on the two fundamental as-
sumptions of the Galor and Zeira model (that is, credit constraints
combined with fixed costs for individual investment projects), and
provided theoretical support for a positive correlation between equal-
ity and economic growth and for a critical role of the initial income
distribution on the long-run steady-state equilibrium.2
Moreover, in accordance with this approach, Aghion et al. (1999),
following Benabou (1996), argue that, in presence of imperfect cap-
ital markets, inequality negatively affects economic growth for at
least three reasons: it reduces investment opportunities for poor
agents, it decreases the effort of the borrowers to accumulate wealth
since they must share a fraction of the marginal returns of their ef-
fort with lenders, it generates macro-economic volatility because an
unequal access to investment opportunities leads to a separation
between investors and savers.3 Finally, the recent paper by Papa-
2In the model developed by Piketty (1997), for example, it is the effort level, rather than
capital investment, that is indivisible. Mookherjee and Ray (2003), on the other hand prove
that multiple equilibria arise from the indivisibility of the returns to education. Banerjee and
Newman (1993) assume that fixed costs are associated with entrepreneurial activities rather
than to investment in human capital.
3This result is based on the assumption that only a fraction of savers can invest in more
productive projects. This implies the lack of an equilibrium between supply and demand
for investment in more productive technologies. Therefore, a fraction of savings accumulated
during the periods of economic expansion becomes idle and has to be invested in a traditional
technology, leading the economy into a low-productivity phase. This in turn allows a reduction
of the interest rate, that implies a new increase in investment and therefore, a new boom.
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georgiou and Razak (2010) exploits the GZ setup to analyze em-
pirically the relationship between inequality and economic growth
through the human capital channel. Using a two-stage specifica-
tion, where the instruments for education are the gini index and a
dummy variable for poor countries, they find strong evidence of a
negative relationship between inequality and economic growth.
The political economy approach developed, among others, by
Persson and Tabellini (1994), Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Per-
otti (1996), further suggests the existence of an inverse relationship
between inequality and economic growth. In particular, Persson
and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) argue that a
greater inequality leading to higher redistribution distorts invest-
ment decisions, and therefore negatively affects economic growth.4
Perotti (1996), using cross-country growth regressions, finds that
a greater inequality leading to a higher political (rent-seeking ac-
tivities) and social instability (violent protests, assassinations, and
coups) reduces investment and growth. Moreover, he shows that a
more equal income distribution favors the accumulation of human
capital and that this relationships is reinforced by the consideration
of fertility. That is, lower inequality is associated not only to higher
rates of investment in education but also to lower fertility rates that
further favor economic growth.
The recent literature has focused on other possible mechanisms
through which inequality can influence the process of economic de-
velopment. Galor et al. (2009), for example, focus on inequality in
the distribution of landownership and suggest that it may adversely
affect human capital accumulation. The basic assumption is that
landowners have no economic incentives to support human capital
accumulation because it decreases returns to land due to the mi-
gration of labor force to the industrial sector. Therefore, economies
characterized by high inequality in landownership show a low level
of human capital and slower growth, whereas the economies with
4The basic idea is that redistributive policies as, for example, transfer payments and the
associated tax on labor income, discourage work effort reducing the investment in physical and
human capital.
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an equal distribution of land show a rapid process of development
and the emergence of a skill-intensive industrial sector.
Galor and Weil (1996), Dahan and Tsiddon (1998) and De la
Croix and Doepke (2003), instead, argue that the main channel
by which inequality affects economic growth is the fertility rate.
In particular they show that higher inequality, by increasing the
fertility differential between rich and poor families, lowers average
education and therefore growth.
Other studies such as Barro (2000) and Chen (2003), have devi-
ated from the examination of the channels through which inequality
may affect growth, and restricted their attention to the reduced-
form relationship between inequality and growth. They show that
inequality can be harmful for growth only when countries are poor,
restoring the classical Kuznets curve results.5
Finally the recent paper by Halter et al. (2014) argues that in-
equality has a positive effect on economic growth in the short run
while it has a negative effect on economic performance in the long
run. The basic idea is that the positive effects of inequality on eco-
nomic growth, as for example a higher aggregate saving as suggested
by Kaldor (1955), or the fact that with capital market imperfections
a more concentrated distribution of income may favor high-return
projects, tend to appear in the short run. On the other hand, the
negative effects which rely on the political economy approach as the
rise in the socio political instability or the change of institutions,
tend to operate only on the long run.
III. The Galor and Zeira Model
In this section we describe the theoretical background of the pa-
per. In particular: in Section III.A. we summarize the model of
Galor and Zeira (1993), highlighting the conditions for the exis-
tence of multiple equilibria, while in Section III.B. we analyze the
5A related strand of research regards the question of whether growth is good or not for
the poor, where the hypothesis usually tested is whether economic growth reduces or increases
inequality. For instance, Kraay (2006), using decomposition methods, finds correlation among
poverty reduction and determinants of growth in average incomes.
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consequences of a decrease in the world interest rate for the long-run
dynamics of inequality and growth.6
III.A. Bequest Dynamics and Multiple Equilibria
In the GZ model, the economy is populated by overlapping gen-
erations of individuals living for two periods: childhood and adult-
hood. Agents can either work as unskilled in both periods or acquire
human capital in childhood and work as skilled in adulthood. Their
utility depends on consumption in the second period and on the be-
quest left to their offspring. Population is constant. Production is
carried out by firms that can use two technologies: one that utilizes
skilled labor and capital, and one using unskilled labor only.
In the first period agents receive an inheritance x from their
parents. If the inheritance is sufficiently high, i.e. it is greater than
or equal to the fixed cost of education h, agents can acquire human
capital without borrowing money. On the contrary, if x < h agents
can choose either to borrow at interest rate i or, otherwise, not to
invest in education and work as unskilled in both periods. Agents
who choose to work as unskilled in both periods earn a wage wn
in both periods, whereas agents choosing to acquire education in
childhood earn the skilled wage ws in their adulthood.
A fundamental assumption of the GZ model is the presence of
credit markets’ imperfections, so that i > r, where r is the lending
interest rate, which is assumed to be given by the world interest
rate.7 The assumption depends on the hypothesis that borrowers
may evade repayment, and therefore lenders must monitor them at
a cost.8
Galor and Zeira (1993) show that the borrowing interest rate for





6The main references are Galor and Zeira (1993) and Galor (2011).
7That is, the model is designed for a small open economy.
8In the model this assumption holds only for individuals wishing to borrow money. Firms,
on the contrary, can borrow at the world interest rate r to finance investment in capital on the
assumption that evading the repayment is more difficult for them.
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where β > 1 is an “evasion cost”, that is the cost that the borrowers
incur to evade debt payments.
The first order conditions, when some restrictions hold (see be-
low), yield the following optimal choices of bequests. Agents with
inheritance x > h invest in human capital and are lenders leaving a
bequest:
bls = (1− α) [ws + (x− h) (1 + r)] , (2)
where α < 1 is the parameter of the utility function measuring the
weight of consumption on utility.
Agents receiving x < h can be lenders or borrowers. An agent
deciding to work as unskilled and not to invest in human capital is
a lender leaving a bequest:
bn = (1− α)[(x+ wn)(1 + r) + wn]. (3)
On the other hand, agents receiving x < h that invest in human
capital are borrowers who leave a bequest:
bbs = (1− α) [ws + (x− h)(1 + i)] . (4)
A condition, based on comparison of indirect utilities, rules out
the case that agents always prefer to work as unskilled 9. In partic-
ular, the skilled wage should be sufficiently high, i.e.:
ws − wn(2 + r)
(1 + r)
≥ h. (5)
This ensures that lenders, i.e. agents with inheritance x > h, will
invest. Borrowers, i.e. agents with x < h, instead invest in human
capital if the following condition holds:
x > f =
1
(i− r)
[wn(2 + r) + h(1 + i)− ws]. (6)
Eq. (6) implies that: “individuals who inherit an amount smaller
than f would prefer not to invest in human capital but work as
unskilled” (Galor and Zeira, 1993, p. 40).
9That is bls > b
n.
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The bequests dynamics is summarized in Eq. (7). To focus on
the effect of changes in the world interest rate on the evolution of




bn = (1− α)[(xt + wn)(1 + r) + wn] xt < f
bbs = (1− α)
[





f ≤ xt < h
bls = (1− α) [ws + (xt − h) (1 + r)] h ≤ xt
(7)





Figure 1: Bequest dynamics and multiple equilibria
Figure 1 shows three equilibria, two of which are stable, x¯n and
x¯s, while g is unstable. The values of the three equilibria are pre-
sented in Eqq. (8)-(10).
10Literally, bequest should belong to the category of wealth, but from the way the model
is formulated, it corresponds to income that can be spent by individuals in the first period to
acquire human capital or added to wn and transferred to the second period of their life. For this
reason, in the discussion of the model and in the empirical analysis we consider the distribution
of income as the relevant distribution to study inequality and human capital accumulation, as
also suggested by Galor (2011, pp. 16-17).
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x¯n =
(1− α)wn (2 + r)
1− (1− α) (1 + r)
, (8)
g =
(1− α) [hβ (1 + r)− ws (β − 1)]
β (1 + r) (1− α)− (β − 1)
, (9)
x¯s =
(1− α) [ws − h (1 + r)]
1− (1− α) (1 + r)
. (10)
The existence of three equilibria requires two additional assump-
tions on the slopes of the functions in Eq. (7), in addition to the
conditions in Eqq. (5) and (6), that is:
Assumption 1







(1 + r) (1− α) > 1⇒ r > rmin =
αβ − 1
β(1− α).
Assumptions 1 and 2, as indicated, imply that the world interest
rate r must be bounded from above and below, that is:
rmin < r < rmax. (11)
The conditions in Eqq. (5) and (6), therefore, must hold for this
range of interest rates.
From Figure 1 we see that if xt < g, the transfers across gener-
ations diminish over time and the system converges to the steady
state equilibrium x¯n which can be defined a poverty trap. When
xt > g the bequest across generations converges to the stable equi-
librium value of x¯s.
11
11The value of g expressed as a function of the borrowing interest rate i (see Galor and Zeira,
1993, p. 41), is:
g =
(1− α) [h(1 + i)− ws]
(1 + i) (1− α)− 1
,
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We gather the previous results in the following proposition which
will be useful for the analysis of the effects of changes in the world
interest rate on the model’s dynamics.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 and the conditions in
Eqq. (5) and (6), the dynamics displays multiple equilibria if the
following conditions hold:
xt+1(xt = h) > h
xt+1(xt = f) < f.
The crucial implication of the model is that initial inequality
can become persistent. The bequest of the generations starting
below the threshold value g will converge to x¯n, while the bequest
of the generations starting above g will converge to x¯s. Members
of the former will be unable to accumulate human capital in the
long run and will remain poor, while members of the latter will
accumulate human capital and become rich. This has implications
for the aggregate output of the economy because in this model the
larger is the fraction of individuals investing in human capital, the
larger is aggregate output (Galor and Zeira, 1993, p. 42).
In the context of cross-country comparisons, the model can there-
fore account for the persistence of income differences (or non-convergence,
see e.g. Quah 1993 and 1997), that can depend on: “differences in
investment in human capital, due to credit market imperfection”
(Galor and Zeira, 1993, p. 37). That is, countries with larger frac-
tions of skilled individuals will be richer.
Finally, the model provides different predictions for the effect of
inequality on growth that depend on whether the economy is ini-
tially “poor” or “rich”. We summarize these predictions in Figures
2 and 3, from Galor (2011, pp. 19-21).
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Figure 2: Poor countries: inequality
is good for growth
Figure 3: Rich countries: inequality
is bad for growth
Figures 2 and 3 show that initially “poor” economies, i.e. economies
with initial average bequest below the threshold, higher inequality
may imply that more agents are rich enough to invest in human cap-
ital and, therefore, inequality is good for growth. On the contrary,
for initially “rich” economies, i.e. economies with initial average be-
quest above the threshold, higher inequality may imply that more
agents fall in the basin of attraction of x¯n and, therefore, inequality
is bad for growth.
In the following section we discuss the effects of changes in the
world interest rate on the dynamics of the model.
III.B. The World Interest Rate and the Long-Run Dy-
namics of Inequality and Growth
In the previous section we highlighted the effect of initial inequal-
ity on the long-run distribution of the population among skilled and
unskilled and on the level of aggregate output, for a given set of pa-
rameters. In this section, instead, we study the consequences for the
long-run dynamics of a change in one parameter, the world interest
World Interest Rates, Inequality and Growth 15
rate r, for a given initial income distribution.
In particular we show that, under some restrictions,12 there exists
a threshold level of r, rmin < r¯ < rmax, such that if r > r¯, the
economy is characterized only by the globally stable equilibrium x¯s.
If the interest rate is below this threshold, i.e. rmin < r < r¯, with
a supplementary assumption of the cost of education, the economy
displays multiple equilibria including a poverty trap.
We can, therefore, state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1 - 2 and the conditions in Eqq.
(5) and (6), if the world interest rate r is above r¯, then the dynamical
system in Eq. (7) displays a unique globally stable equilibrium, x¯s.
If the interest rate falls below r¯, and the following condition holds:
F1(r)
F2(r)
< h < ws(1 − α), then the dynamical system in Equation 7
displays multiple equilibria.
Proof. see Appendix A
Figure 4 shows the consequences of a reduction in r following
Proposition 2. The dynamical system undergoes a qualitative change
switching from a system characterized by a unique equilibrium (thick
red line), to a multiple equilibria system (thin blue line).13
12See Appendix A for details.
13Galor (1996, p. 1067), discusses the case in which, in a similar framework, technological
progress may qualitatively change the dynamics, by turning a multiple equilibria dynamics
into a dynamics characterized by a unique globally stable equilibrium. Fiaschi and Lavezzi
(2007) argue that the oil shocks of the seventies contributed to shift the cross-country nonlinear
growth path downwards, providing a prediction similar to the one presented in this paper: a
dynamics featuring one globally stable equilibrium becomes a multiple equilibria dynamics.
The explanation provided is based on the diffusion of technologies across countries which may
have become more difficult as countries started to converge to different equilibria, as suggested
by the theory of appropriate technology (see, e.g. Basu and Weil, 1998).
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g hf
xt+1
xtx¯n x¯sf ′ x¯′
s
Figure 4: Effects of a reduction in the world interest rate on the model dynamics.
In particular, when the dynamical system becomes characterized
by multiple equilibria, following the intuition of Galor (2011), the
crucial issue is whether a country is initially “poor” or “rich”, i.e.
whether the average of the income distribution is located to the
left or to the right of g, and how much dispersed the distribution
is. In other words the location in the graph and the dispersion of
the initial income distribution are crucial determinants of the long-
run dynamics. Specifically, these two characteristics would allow
to predict the direction of change of income inequality within a
country, its capacity to accumulate human capital, and its long-run
aggregate output level. For example, an initially poor country with
most of the income distribution mass concentrated on the left of g
would experience a reduction in inequality (as the distribution will
shrink around x¯n), and low growth, as a small fraction of individuals
will accumulate human capital in the long run.
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IV. Empirical Analysis
In this section we present the empirical analysis.14 In particular
we aim at showing that a reduction of the world interest rate in
the period 1985-2005 contributes to the explanation of the lack of
cross-country convergence in per-capita GDP observed in the same
period. The relevant channels are: the effect of world interest rate
on income inequality within countries, the effect of inequality on
human capital accumulation and the effect of human capital on
GDP. First of all we describe the dataset, while in Sections IV.A.
and IV.B. we present, respectively, the relevant stylized facts and
the econometric analysis.
Table 1 describes the main variables used in the empirical analy-
sis.15 To compute the world interest rate we follow Barro and Sala-I-
Martin (1990) by building a global measure as a GDP-weighted av-
erage of national real interest rates on long-term government bonds
of eight large-GDP countries (we use the US interest rate as an
alternative measure).16
To measure inequality we use Gini indices of gross and net in-
comes from the database of Solt (2010), that reports standardized
values for a large set of countries.17 Finally, data on real GDP per
worker (RGDPCH) are from the Penn World Table 7.1 (Heston et
al., 2011), while data on human capital are from the new Barro and
Lee (2011) enlarged education dataset.
14Data and codes are available at: http://www.unipa.it/ mario.lavezzi/research.html.
15The sources of other variables used as controls in the econometric analysis are reported in
Section IV.B..
16Specifically, data on interest rates are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.
The eight countries considered are: Belgium, Canada, Japan, France, Netherlands, UK, US,
Sweden. With respect to Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1990) we do not consider Italy and Germany
for lack of data on the relevant period. The eight countries account for 48.2% of world GDP in
1985, computed considering 190 countries, while the ten countries of Barro and Sala-I-Martin
(1990) account for approximately 65% of world GDP, computed on a total of 144 countries.
Adding Italy and Germany, for the available years, i.e. 1992-2006, generates a value of the
world interest rate that is correlated at 99% to the one used in the paper. The consideration of
Italy and Germany would make the sample of 10 countries account for 56.75% of world GDP
in 1985.
17The measure of income adopted is: “income per capita, household adult equivalent”. For
simplicity in the paper we will often define the indices “Gini gross” and “Gini net”.
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Description Coverage Source
World Interest rate GDP-Weighted rates 1960-2005 Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1990),
for 8 large-GDP countries IMF
Human Capital Average schooling years, 1950-2010 Barro and Lee (2011)
share of population with completed education
for population aged 15-99
GDP per capita Real per capita GDP 1950-2011 P.W.T. 7.1
constant prices, chain series
Income inequality Gini index of gross and net incomes 1963-2009 Solt (2010)
Table 1: Sources for the main variables used in the empirical analysis
In the next section we present the relevant stylized facts on these
variables.
IV.A. Stylized facts for the period 1985-2005
In this section we present some stylized facts on world interest
rate, economic growth, inequality and human capital accumulation
for a large sample of countries for the period 1985-2005. We choose
this period because it is characterized by a clear downward tendency
of the world interest rate, while the previous period was character-
ized by strong instability caused by the oil shocks of the seventies.18
Taking this into account, we selected a sample of 75 countries in
order to have the largest possible balanced panel of data on GDP
and inequality at 5-year intervals.19
Figure 5 shows the dynamics of the world interest rate (along
with that for the US interest rate): a clear declining pattern for
both rates characterizes the period 1985-2005. Interest rates, in
particular, decrease from a value around 6% to less than 2% in 20
years.
18In Figure 17 in Appendix D we report the dynamics of the world interest rate in the period
1970-1985.
19For each country, therefore, we will utilize five observations in the econometric analysis.
Appendix E contains the country list.
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world (black) and US (red) interest rate: 1985−2005
Figure 5: World and US interest rates 1985-2005
In the same period, we can observe a tendency for polarization
in cross-country GDP for our sample of 75 countries, as shown in
Figures 6 and 7.

























Figure 6: Distribution dynamics of
per capita GDP: 1985-2005. 75
countries















































Figure 7: Stochastic Kernel: 1985-
2005, 75 countries, τ = 21. Thick
line: median of the stochastic kernel;
dotted lines: 95% confidence bands.
In particular, in Figure 6 we show the density of incomes in
1985, in 2005 and the ergodic distribution, which represents the
long-run tendency implied by the distribution dynamics between
20 M. Battisti ,T. Fioroni and A. M. Lavezzi
1985 and 2005. The ergodic distribution is obtained from the esti-
mated stochastic kernel (see e. g. Quah, 1997) showed in Figure 7,
mapping the initial distribution of GDP in the final distribution.20
Figure 6 highlights that the distribution dynamics is characterized
by increasing polarization: the mass in the middle of the distribu-
tion tends to vanish as two peaks at low and high income levels
appear.21 The two peaks are located at a value of approximately
0.5 and 1.8. This tendency is also clear from examination of the
estimated stochastic kernel in Figure 7. The probability mass is
concentrated around the 45◦ line and two peaks are clearly visible.
Moreover, the median of the stochastic kernel clearly shows a non-
linear pattern highlighting the tendency for countries around the
two peaks to converge.22 Finally, note that the value of 1, i.e. the
average GDP of the sample, seems to be a fairly good dividing line
between the two basins of attraction.23
Now we consider the dynamics of income inequality and growth
for subsamples of countries. The analysis of Section III. suggests
that there might be differences between poor and rich countries in
the dynamics of inequality, human capital accumulation and growth.
We partition our sample of countries in poor and rich according to
a simple criterion: a country is poor (rich) if its per capita GDP
20The values of GDP are normalized with respect to the sample average in every year, to
take into account the possible presence of global trends. The densities in 1985 and 2005 are the
adaptive kernel estimators of true densities, in which the bandwidth of the kernel (Gaussian in
our case) decreases when the density of observations increases (see Silverman, 1986, pp. 100-
110). The ergodic distribution is computed by utilizing a stochastic kernel estimated following
the procedure proposed by Johnson (2005). A stochastic kernel is an operator mapping the
density of a variable at time t into its density at time t+ τ , τ > 0, and indicates for each level
of the variable in period t its probability distribution in period t + τ over the possible values
of the variable. The relation between the densities and the stochastic kernel is: ft+τ (z) =∫
∞
0
φτ (z|x) ft (x) dx, where z and x are values of the variable, and φτ (z|x) is the stochastic
kernel. To estimate the stochastic kernel φτ (z|x) = φτ (z, x) /f (x) we estimated the joint
density of z and x, φτ (z, x), and the marginal density of x, f (x). In the estimation of φτ (z, x)
we followed Johnson (2005), who used Silverman’s adaptive kernel estimator.
21The recent increase in income polarization is documented in a number of works. See, among
others, Quah (1993 and 1997), Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2003), Battisti and Parmeter (2013).
22In Figure 7 we also report confidence bands estimated by the bootstrap procedure based
on Bowman and Azzalini (1997, p. 44) and described in Fiaschi et al. (2013, pp. 39-40).
23Evidence similar to the one in Figures 6 and 7 can be observed for a larger sample of
countries. See Appendix C. In Appendix D we present the results on the distribution dynamics
in the period 1970-1985, and show that the tendency for polarization was much less evident.
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is below (above) the sample average in at least three of the five
observations we use for the econometric analysis.
poor rich
number of countries 45 30
per capita GDP 1985 3999.45 (0.38) 20519.98 (1.93)
per capita GDP 2005 5936.19 (0.35) 33736.54 (1.98)
annual average growth rate 0.017 0.025
Gini (net) 1985 44.25 29.59
Gini (net) 2005 43.20 31.74
% countries with ∆Gini> 0 0.51 0.73
% countries with ∆Gini<0 0.49 0.27
Gini (gross) 1985 47.46 40.91
Gini (gross) 2005 45.45 46.10
% countries with ∆Gini >0 0.49 0.80
% countries with ∆Gini <0 0.51 0.20
higher ed. (nr. years) 1985 0.17 (0.64) 0.41 (1.53)
higher ed. (nr. years) 2005 0.30 (0.65) 0.71 (1.53)
higher ed. (share pop.) 1985 3.02 (0.64) 7.29 (1.54)
higher ed. (share pop.) 2005 5.27 (0.64) 12.7 (1.54)
total ed. (nr. years) 1985 5.35 (0.79) 8.82 (1.31)
total ed. (nr. years) 2005 7.43 (0.86) 10.44 (1.21)
total ed. (share pop.) 1985 33.16 (0.77) 57.77 (1.34)
total ed. (share pop.) 2005 45.38 (0.89) 59.51 (1.17)
Table 2: Dynamics of economic growth, inequality and human capital accumu-
lation in poor and rich countries: 1985-2005. Within-group average values are
reported. Numbers in parenthesis indicate averages of values normalized with
respect to sample average.
Table 2 shows the following facts about the two groups of coun-
tries: i) there is confirmation of no convergence in per capita GDP.
In particular, the average growth rate of rich countries is higher than
the one of poor countries;24 ii) the dynamics of income inequality
is remarkably different across the two groups. Inequality was ini-
tially higher for the poor and, on average, slightly declined, while it
strongly increased in rich countries (see also the differences in the
percentage of countries that experienced an increase or a decrease of
24Note that the average relative GDP of the two groups is approximately 0.4 and 1.9, in line
with the values highlighted by the graphical representation of the distribution dynamics. The
fact that, on average, GDP increased in rich countries, is apparently in contradiction with the
dynamics implied by Figure 4 which suggests that the long-run level of bequest (and income)
should decrease. However, as we discuss in Appendix V., if we add to the picture an increase
of the skilled/unskilled wage ratio, the equilibrium level of x¯s may shift to the right.
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the Gini index).25 iii) There is convergence in human capital across
the two groups when we consider total education, but there is no
convergence when we consider higher (tertiary) education only.
To highlight the relationship between income and the variation
of the Gini index between 1985 and 2005 without partitioning the
sample, in Figure 8 we report a nonparametric estimation of such
relation, in particular utilizing the average per capita GDP over the
period to measure income.





























































































Figure 8: Variation of the Gini (gross) index and GDP
We can observe that, as GDP increases, the relationship is in-
creasing, moving from negative to positive values.26 Notable ex-
25Our sample of 75 countries is obtained after excluding Rwanda, Nepal and Bangladesh
from the analysis as outliers because they show positive variations of the Gini index between
60% and 80%. In the period of interest, however, Rwanda was plagued by the genocide of
1994, Bangladesh experienced a switch from military regime to democracy in the early nineties,
while Nepal switched from monarchy to democracy in the same period. These massive events
are likely to have conditioned the recorded values of the Gini indices which display the most
anomalous changes with respect to the other countries in the sample.
26A very similar picture is obtained considering the Gini index of net incomes. The estimation
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ceptions at low GDP levels are China, Poland and Hungary, e.g.
countries that in the period of interest moved towards more market-
oriented institutional arrangements.
In the light of the theoretical background discussed in Section
III., we propose the following interpretation of the stylized facts
presented in this section. The reduction of the world interest rate
caused the appearance of multiple equilibria. Poor countries found
themselves in the basin of attraction of the low-income equilib-
rium,27 while rich countries were in the basin of attraction of the
high-income equilibrium. This explains the lack of convergence doc-
umented in Table 2. The income distribution of poor countries,
therefore, was attracted towards the low-income equilibrium. The
income distribution of rich countries, on the contrary, was split in
two parts, belonging to the two different basins of attraction. This
explains the tendency for a reduction of inequality (or stability of in-
equality) in poor countries and for an increase of income inequality
in rich countries. At the root of the different growth performances
lies the accumulation of human capital. We find that it was in par-
ticular human capital in the form of higher (i.e. tertiary) education
that did not converge.28 It is true that human capital accumula-
tion was reduced with respect to its initially potential level in rich
countries, because inequality increased, but since inequality did not
increase in poor countries, the latter were unable to accumulate
enough human capital to catch up with the rich.29
Figures 9 and 10 offer a graphical representation of this hypoth-
is not affected by removing Luxembourg from the sample. The estimation is performed using a
Gaussian kernel, with bandwidth corresponding to its standard deviation. We report variability
bands corresponding to two standard errors above and below the estimated function. See
Bowman and Azzalini (1997, pp.50-51 and 76) for details.
27Literally, in the theoretical model the equilibria correspond to levels of bequest. Being the
bequest a part of income, we consider bequests as proxies for income levels.
28The theoretical model, indeed, suggests that the cost of human capital is faced by the
households as if it was referred to private education. Tertiary education seems to fit better with
this feature, as primary and secondary education are largely provided by the State. Moreover,
human capital in the model is the cause for the difference between being skilled and unskilled,
a distinction usually made between college- and non-college educated individuals (see, e.g.
Philippon and Reshef, 2013, p. 80).
29In Section IV.B. we show that in the period of interest the marginal effect of human capital
on GDP is higher in poor countries, a finding that reinforces this claim.
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esis: the color red refers to initial conditions, and black to the sub-





Figure 9: Poor countries: dynamics
of income and inequality after a de-






Figure 10: Rich countries: dynam-
ics of income and inequality after a
decrease of the world interest rate
In the next section we present the results of the econometric
analysis aiming at testing rigorously these hypotheses.30
IV.B. Econometric analysis
The aim of the econometric analysis is to test the predictions of
the GZ model discussed so far. In particular, we wish to test the
following hypotheses: 1) a reduction in the world interest rate has
a different impact on inequality in the two groups of poor and rich
countries: it should decrease inequality in the former and increase
inequality in the latter.31 2) Inequality has a differential impact
30In Appendix B we discuss a possible alternative scenario, in which the initial state of the
system also features multiple equilibria, and argue that it appears less empirically plausible
than the one described here.
31The GZ model of within-country inequality can be interpreted as focused on income polar-
ization within a country. The validity of the Gini index as a measure of inequality could be
limited when the distribution is not unimodal. Duclos et al. (2004) examine several shapes
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on human capital accumulation: it should increase human capital
accumulation in poor countries and decrease human capital accu-
mulation in rich countries. 3) Human capital has a positive effect
on GDP in both groups.
Therefore, indexing country and time by, respectively, j and t,
we propose a three-step procedure based on the following relations
to be estimated:
(I) inequalityj,t = α0 + α1rt + ...+ ϵj,t
where we expect αˆ1 > 0 in poor countries and αˆ1 < 0 in rich
countries;
(II) human capitalj,t = β0 + β1inequalityj,t + ...+ υj,t
where we expect βˆ1 > 0 in poor countries and βˆ1 < 0 in rich
countries;
(III) GDPj,t = γ0 + γ1human capitalj,t + ...+ ηj,t
where we expect γˆ1 > 0 in poor and rich countries.
of the distribution and possible modifications that can occur. They show that “squeezes” of
the distribution could lead either to higher or to lower polarization, depending on the shape
of the distribution (i.e. the number of modes, their location, etc.). On the other hand, in the
identity-alienation framework of Duclos et al. (2004) it is highlighted that the Gini index is a
good proxy for the polarization index, except for very high values of the α parameter, that is a
polarization-sensitivity parameter, affecting the income distribution and polarization. Overall,
we use the Gini index as our measure of inequality for two reasons. Firstly, it allows us to
obtain a fairly large sample, while computing different indices of polarization across countries
and time would significantly reduce the number of observations. Moreover, it allows consistent
comparisons with previous literature aiming at testing the GZ model (see for example Papa-
georgiou and Razak, 2010), which considered the Gini index, as well as most of the literature on
inequality and growth. However, in order to control for possible shortcomings, we computed the
change of the ratio among the ninth and first decile of the income distribution for each country
for which we have homogeneous observations from 1985 to 2005 (with at least the availability
of the half of the period) in terms of source, income definition, unit of analysis and coverage
(UNU-WIDER, 2008). This reduces the sample to 36 observations, 17 for the rich and 19 for
the poor cluster (the list of countries is available upon request), and for these, we computed
the correlation with the change of the Gini index in the same span of time for each country.
The correlation is very high, equal to 0.67, and if we check for the changes in the Gini index as
in Table 2 for rich and poor we have the same results, with an increase of 6 percentage points
for the rich and a change of 0.03 percentage points for the poor. This suggests that the use of
the Gini index seems to be acceptable, also to check how the difference across income groups
changes over time.
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Step I is also related to the literature on the Kutnetz curve (see,
e. g., Milanovic, 1994, Barro, 2000) where inequality is nonlinearly
influenced by income and by control variables such as human capital,
trade openness and institutional quality.32
After partitioning the countries in rich and poor, to estimate the
relation in Step I we run the following regression:33
Ginij,t = α0 + α1rt + α1 ·Drt + α2GDPj,t + ...+ ϵj,t (12)
where t = 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005; D is a dummy variable such
thatD = 1 if country is rich andD = 0 otherwise, while r represents
the world interest rate. The expectation, therefore, is that the effect
given by α1 is positive, while when the effect of world interest rate is
measured by the interaction of α1 with D, it is negative, significant,
and greater in absolute value than the effect given by α1 alone. We
use GDP per capita as regressor in this benchmark specification to
control for the initial “location” of the country and as a synthetic
index of other possible determinants of inequality. We estimate
this equation as a fixed effect (FE) panel regression with either
balanced or unbalanced panel data,34 considering lagged values of
the regressors, on the assumption that the effects we study may
take time to manifest, and to attenuate the issue of endogeneity.35
Results are presented in Table 3.
32See also Kraay (2006) and Beck et al (2007) for related works on the determinants of
inequality.
33To study the period 1985-2005, we consider a sample of 75 countries, for which we have a
balanced panel of inequality and growth determinants data at 5-year intervals (in few cases we
replace the initial observation, if not available, with the closest one, e. g. the observation for
year 1986 instead of 1985). We consider this sample and a larger unbalanced sample (containing
also countries that do not appear for all the periods for all the variables) including 128 countries.
This list is available upon request.
34It is possible that, when we consider other regressors than GDP, a country does not have
observations for the whole period.
35Results are not affected by considering contemporaneous values of the regressors.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent variable Gini Net Gini Gross Gini Net Gini Gross Gini Net Gini Gross Gini Net Gini Gross
GDP−5 3.764∗∗∗ 3.384∗∗ 36.160∗∗∗ 22.775∗∗ 49.338∗∗∗ 37.160∗∗∗ 18.105∗∗∗ 28.021∗
(1.343) (1.602) (9.47) (11.52) (10.12) (12.50) (9.401) (11.236)
GDP squared−5 -1.9222∗∗∗ -0.665 -2.702∗∗∗ -2.020∗∗∗ -0.92∗ -1.488∗
(0.556) (0.685) (0.602) (0.744) (0.556) (0.665)
World Interest rate−5 0.559∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗ 0.410∗∗ 0.424∗
(0.172) (0.205) (0.168) (0.204) (0.168) (0.208) (0.191) (0.228)
World Interest rate−5*D -0.602∗∗ -1.096∗∗∗ -1.247∗∗∗ -1.482∗∗∗ -1.358∗∗∗ -1.485∗∗∗ -1.072∗∗∗ -1.609∗∗∗
(0.249) (0.297) (0.307) (0.373) (0.310) (0.384) (0.320) (0.383)
Trade Openness % GDP−5 0.014 0.022 -0.002 0.0151
(0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.150)
Public expenditure % GDP−5 0.090 -0.075 -0.093 -0.036
(0.112) (0.138) (0.106) (0.126)
Institutional quality−5 -0.241 -0.471 0.409 0.214
(0.275) (0.340) (0.308) (0.369)
Obs 300 300 300 300 287 287 467 467
Test coeffs WIR=-1*RICH 0.03 4.60 5.46 7.52 7.49 7.14 11.80 15.54
P-value (0.85) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.001) (0.001)
Balanced Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Table 3: Regression of Inequality on World Interest rate, 1985-2005. Standard
errors in parenthesis. ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote significant coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10%
Models 1 and 2 are estimations of Eq. (12) in which we only
control for GDP. The estimates show that the documented decrease
in the world interest rate had a positive effect on inequality in poor
countries (i.e. inequality in those countries decreased as well) and
a negative and significant effect in rich countries as shown by the
coefficient of the interaction between the world interest rate and the
dummy for “rich” countries. We can reject the hypothesis of equal-
ity of the estimated coefficients for the effect of the world interest
rate.
In Models 3 and 4 we introduce a squared term for GDP to
control for the possible presence of “Kuznets curve” effects. There
is some evidence of such effects, in particular when we consider Gini
net. The main results on the coefficients of interest are confirmed,
and the differences in the effect in poor and rich countries increase.
Models 5-8 feature the introduction of other possible determi-
nants of inequality considered in the literature.36 In particular we
considered: trade openness, as the latter may affect the internal
demand of skills and impact on inequality through wage differen-
tials; institutional quality, as institutions may affect inequality as
they influence the allocation of factors and the overall functioning
36See, e.g., Barro (2000) and Beck et al. (2000).
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of the economy; a measure of public expenditure on GDP, on the
assumption that public sector intervention may reduce inequality.37
Results show that these additional variables are scarcely significant.
Our coefficients of interest, however, remain highly significant.
Another version of this test,38 i.e. of whether the effect of the
world interest rate is different for poor and rich countries, that uti-
lizes a nonparametric estimation of Model 1 following Li and Racine
(2007), allows to rank the coefficients of the effect of the world inter-
est rate on inequality, at different GDP levels on the pooled sample.
This allows us to avoid an ex-ante partition of the countries.

























Figure 11: Nonparametric estimation of the effect of the world interest rate on
inequality at different levels of log GDP per capita. We report the variabilty
bands of the estimate (see Footnote 26)
As we see from Figure 11, where we report the country average of
the world interest rate coefficients (gradients) on inequality, ranked
37The openness measure, given by the sum of export and import over GDP, and the percentage
of public expenditures on GDP, come from PWT 7.1 (Heston et al., 2012), while the ICRG82
is the score of Knack and Keefer (1995) in the available initial year for each country.
38We also tried separate fixed effects estimations for the groups of poor and rich countries,
always obtaining positive and significant coefficients of the effect of world interest rate for poor
countries and negative and significant coefficients for the rich ones. The alternative results are
available upon request.
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on the country mean GDP over the available periods, the estimated
relation is decreasing. This confirms the results with FE estimation:
as GDP increases, the marginal effect of the world interest rate on
inequality decreases, moving from positive to negative values.
On the basis of this different results for rich and poor, we con-
sider Steps II and III by means of a 3-stage least squares system in
which in the first stage we study the effect of inequality on human
capital, and in the second stage the effect of human capital on GDP.
Results are presented in the two panels of Table 4: the upper panel
contains the results of the estimation of the effect of human capital
on GDP (our Step III), while the lower panel contains the results of
our Step II, i.e. the estimated effects of inequality on human cap-
ital.39 We use the average numbers of years of tertiary education
in the population and shares of population with completed tertiary
education as our human capital variables. In addition to this, we
instrument investments with their past values.
Looking at the lower panel of Table 4 we first of all note that
inequality has a significant negative effect on human capital accu-
mulation only in rich countries (except in Models 5 and 9). In poor
countries, the coefficient is generally positive but not significant,
except for the specification of Model 10 in which the effect is posi-
tive and significant. This result does not seem affected by possible
changes in the length of the lags. Considering the Gini net the signs
are as expected, but the coefficients are not significant.40
Looking at the upper panel of Table 4 we notice that human cap-
ital has a positive and strongly significant effect on GDP in both
subsets of countries. In particular, the estimated coefficient is al-
39The regression to evaluate the effect of human capital on GDP is estimated, following
Mankiw et al. (1992) as an “augmented” Solow model. In the regression of human capital on
inequality, we also control for lagged values of human capital itself, given the persistency of this
variable, and as proxies of other determinants of human capital. We keep these specifications
simple, as it is beyond the scope of this paper to identify the best selection of regressors (see
Durlauf et al., 2005, on the issue of model specification of growth regressions).
40The other possible combinations of Gini (gross and net) with other human capital variables
at 5- and 10-year lags give similar results. Considering the share of population with completed
(total) education produces non significant results for the group of rich countries, as this variable
changes a little in the period of interest.
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ways higher in poor countries and, in comparison with the effect
exerted by total education, the marginal effect of tertiary educa-
tion seems particularly strong when measured by the average years
of higher education in the population.41 We argue that this result
corroborates the claim that nonconvergence in tertiary education
contributes to the explanation of nonconvergence in GDP.42
41This result suggests the presence of decreasing returns to human capital (see Mankiw et
al., 1992).
42A more detailed evaluation of this effect with respect to other determinants of nonconver-
gence in GDP is left for future research.
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dependent variable: GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Rich Poor Rich Poor Rich Poor Rich Poor Rich Poor
Higher education 0.362∗∗∗ 2.155∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 2.139∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 2.151∗∗∗
(years of schooling) (0.111) (0.300) (0.111) (0.300) (0.112) (0.300)
Higher education 0.021∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(% pop. completed) (0.006) (0.016)
Total education 0.083∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗
(years of schooling) (0.023) (0.028)
Investment 0.003 0.013∗ 0.005 0.018∗∗ 0.006 0.017∗∗ 0.003 0.017∗∗∗ 0.002 0.005
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Population growth -2.222∗∗ -3.931∗∗∗ -2.338∗∗ -3.593∗∗∗ -2.341∗∗∗ -3.930∗∗∗ -2.152∗∗∗ -3.699∗∗∗ -2.091∗∗∗ -1.517
(1.002) (1.023) (0.999) (1.023) (1.001) (1.023) (0.994) (1.078) (0.969) (1.024)
Constant 10.049∗∗∗ 7.821∗∗∗ 9.987∗∗∗ 7.831∗∗∗ 9.948∗∗∗ 7.828∗∗∗ 10.038∗∗∗ 7.942∗∗∗ 9.461∗∗∗ 6.693∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.215) (0.206) (0.215) (0.208) (0.215) (0.211) (0.224) (0.322) (0.272)
R2 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.32 0.10 0.32 0.13 0.24 0.15 0.42
Dep. var. Human Capital
Gini gross−5 -0.381∗∗ 0.027 -0.056∗ 0.009 -0.540 0.856∗
(0.168) (0.057) (0.031) (0.014) (0.870) (0.470)
Gini gross−10 -0.469∗∗∗ 0.065
(0.159) (0.055)
Gini net−10 -0.158 0.032
(0.181) (0.055)
Higher education 1.031∗∗∗ 1.158∗∗∗ 1.020∗∗∗ 1.162∗∗∗ 1.026∗∗∗ 1.159∗∗∗
(years schooling)−10 (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Higher education 1.052∗∗∗ 1.191∗∗∗
(% pop. completed)−10 (0.038) (0.041)
Total education −10 0.782∗∗∗ 0.949∗∗∗
(years of schooling) (0.029) ( 0.023)
Constant 0.299∗∗∗ 0.023 0.337∗∗∗ 0.008 0.187∗∗∗ 0.025 4.750∗∗∗ 0.190 2.996∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.031) (0.070) (0.029) (0.060) (0.027) (1.374) (0.685) (0.464) (0.270)
R2 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.92
Dep. var. Investment rates
Investment−5 0.697∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.046) (0.056) (0.046) (0.056) (0.046) (0.056) (0.046) (0.055) (0.045)
Constant 8.217∗∗∗ 6.211∗∗∗ 8.230∗∗∗ 6.215∗∗∗ 8.379∗∗∗ 6.211∗∗∗ 8.232∗∗∗ 6.197∗∗∗ 8.142∗∗∗ 6.662∗∗∗
(1.455) (1.138) (1.454) (1.138) (1.454) (1.138) (1.455) (1.138) (1.450) (1.127)
R2 0.58 0.61 0.58 0.61 0.58 0.61 0.58 0.61 0.58 0.61
Obs 112 168 112 168 112 168 112 168 112 168
Table 4: System of regressions: final dependent variable GDP. ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ represent significant
coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10%. In the 3SLS estimations the endogenous variables are respec-
tively human capital in the second system and human capital and investment in the third one.
All variables are in logs. Standard errors in parenthesis.
To sum up, the econometric analysis provides support for the fol-
lowing picture. A decreasing world interest rate increases inequality
in rich countries and decreases inequality in poor countries. In-
equality reduces human capital accumulation in rich countries (and
is therefore “bad for growth”), and has a positive (but mostly not
significant) effect in poor countries. We cannot make the strong
claim that it is therefore “good for growth”, but it is clearly not
“bad for growth” as in rich countries.
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Our results are in contrast with Barro (2000) and Chen (2000)
who argue that higher inequality retards growth in poor countries
and encourages growth in rich countries. On the other hand, our
results for rich countries are in accordance with the strand of the
literature which suggests that inequality is harmful for economic
growth that is, among others, Persson and Tabellini (1994), Alesina
and Rodrik (1994), Perotti (1996), Galor and Weil (1996), Dahan
and Tsiddon (1998) and De la Croix and Doepke (2003).43
The closest comparison is Papageorgiou and Razak (2010) that
found a negative effect of inequality on growth through human cap-
ital. However, there are two major differences: i) they do not esti-
mate a different relationship for rich and poor but just introduce a
dummy for the poor44 ii) they do not take into account, neither the-
oretically, nor empirically, the possibility of changes in the interest
rate so that our first step does not appear in their work.
In the next section we explore an alternative theory that may
account for our stylized facts.
V. A Possible Alternative Channel
Another channel through which inequality may affect economic
growth could be based on the impact of the reduction in interest rate
43In a recent paper, Lin et al. (2014) find evidence of a positive effect of inequality (measured
by the top 1% income share) on per capita income growth, above a given threshold. However,
there are remarkable differences with respect to our study: first of all, they consider a reduced
form equation (estimated as a threshold panel regression), and not a structural one (as we
propose in this paper, by the two-step strategy with fixed effects and then 3SLS), so that there
is no direct consideration of the effect of inequality on growth through the human capital channel
(as suggested by the GZ model). In fact Lin et al. (2014) consider the channel suggested by
Galor and Tsiddon (1997), focusing on technological innovation. Secondly, they use a sample
of US States from 1945 to 2004, so that period is quite different (given that the global shocks
analysed in our paper for instance go in opposite directions in ’70s and ’80s, a larger period
as in Lin et al (2014) cannot allow to have the same prescription on the basis of GZ model)
and, more importantly, they only consider “rich” countries (as US States are with respect to
developing countries). Thirdly, the inequality measure is far different from ours. A comparable
comparison of rich and poor countries’ inequality like the one proposed here through the income
share of the top 1% is still not feasible, given the available data (see the Alvaredo et al., 2014,
database).
44The same holds for the model of De la Croix and Doepke (2003), which is also considered
by Papageorgiou and Razak (2010).
World Interest Rates, Inequality and Growth 33
on physical capital investment. Specifically, a reduction of interest
rates should stimulate investment, but inequality and human capital
can also be affected, as the following argument illustrates.45
Let us assume that: i) rich countries are endowed with both
skilled and unskilled labor, while poor countries are endowed with
unskilled labor only, and ii) capital is complementary to skilled la-
bor, and a substitute for unskilled labour. This implies that in
rich countries capital accumulation following a decrease in inter-
est rates increases the demand for skilled labor leading to a higher
wage differential and therefore to greater inequality,46 while in poor
countries inequality is not affected. This argument is in the line the
theory of “directed technological change” (Acemoglu, 2002).
In this case the prediction is that the documented decrease in
the world interest rate should increase investment in both rich and
poor countries. Increase in investment in rich countries should in-
crease inequality while it should have a non-significant effect in poor
countries.47
Table 5 contains the results of regressions testing this hypothesis.
It can be observed that in all specifications, the effect of the world
interest rate on investment is significant and has the predicted sign
in both rich and poor countries, also taking into account individ-
ual countries’ interest rate.48 However, the effect of investment on
inequality strongly depends on the inequality measure we adopt.
In the Models 5-8, based on Gini net, the coefficients have the ex-
pected sign, but are significant only for rich countries. In the first
four specifications, based on Gini gross, the sign of the effect of
investments is opposite to what expected for rich countries, and is
negative but not significant for poor countries.
Overall, we find mixed evidence that this alternative channel may
45We thank Costas Azariadis for suggesting us to explore this route.
46See, e.g. Atkinson (1997) for a discussion of wage differentials and inequality.
47For the same reasons we mentioned in the presentation of Tables 3 and 4, we present results
where the values of the regressors are lagged. Also in this case, using simultaneous values of
the variables does not affect the results.
48We considered the “real interest rate” from the World Bank Indicators. Interestingly,
domestic interest rates have non-significant effects on investments. This is in line with the GZ
model that argues that the relevant rate for firms’ investment is the world interest rate.
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Gini gross Gini net
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Rich Poor Rich Poor Rich Poor Rich Poor
Investment−5 -0.187∗∗ -0.060 -0.113 -0.058 0.235∗∗ -0.068 0.339∗∗∗ -0.064
(0.095) (0.076) (0.091) (0.084) (0.091) (0.080) (0.093) (0.088)
GDP−5 134.11∗∗ -2.518 102.98 5.045 29.191 9.226 33.070 14.541
(61.52) (11.769) (65.55) (12.814) (58.639) (12.513) (66.911) (13.432)
GDP squared−5 -6.501∗∗ 0.189 -4.963 -0.295 -1.659 -0.635 -1.811 -0.976
(3.019) (0.746) (3.228) (0.816) (2.878) (0.793) (3.295) (0.856)
Constant -641.56∗∗ 55.71 -486.72 27.742 -99.582 13.644 -126.16 -5.703
(313.52) (45.66) (332.94) (49.467) (298.86) (48.544) (339.86) (51.855)
R2 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.15 0.01
Dep. var. Investment−5
World Interest Rate−10 -0.877∗∗∗ -1.259∗∗∗ -0.624∗∗ -1.080∗∗ -0.985∗∗∗ -1.242∗∗∗ -0.785∗∗∗ -1.055∗∗
(0.229) (0.340) (0.265) (0.469) (0.228) (0.341) (0.265) (0.470)
Country interest rate−10 -0.056 0.011 -0.047 0.012
(0.050) (0.039) (0.050) (0.039)
Investment−10 0.770∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.041) (0.050) (0.050) (0.044) (0.041) (0.050) (0.050)
Constant 9.477∗∗∗ 10.490∗∗∗ 8.859∗∗∗ 9.111∗∗∗ 10.024∗∗∗ 10.418∗∗∗ 9.558∗∗∗ 9.008∗∗∗
(1.456) (1.634) (1.676) (2.181) (1.454) (1.638) (1.674) (2.187)
R2 0.72 0.63 0.71 0.63 0.72 0.63 0.71 0.63
Obs 120 180 101 134 120 180 101 134
Table 5: 3SLS System of regressions. Final dependent variable: Inequality. Stan-
dard errrors in parenthesis. ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ represent significant coefficients at 1%, 5%
and 10% In the 3SLS estimations the endogenous variable is the investment.
explain the relationship between the fall in world interest rate and
the dynamics of inequality in rich and poor countries. Differently
from our previous results, there appears a stronger dependence on
the type of Gini index considered.49
VI. Conclusions
In this paper we studied the effects of the world interest rate on
the dynamics of within- and cross-country income inequality, follow-
ing the insights of the model of Galor and Zeira (1993). We found
evidence of an effect of world interest rate on within-country income
inequality, but this effect differs between rich and poor countries.
Specifically, a decrease in the world interest rate, characterizing re-
cent decades, caused an increase in inequality in rich countries, and
49The correlation among the two Gini measures (on net and gross incomes) is higher than
0.90 in our sample, but if we only consider rich countries it drops at 0.53. This is not surprising
given the redistributive effects of fiscal policy in rich countries.
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a decrease in poor countries.
The effect of inequality on human capital accumulation, and
therefore on economic growth, also differs between poor and rich.
Inequality is negatively associated to human capital accumulation in
rich countries, while it has a positive (but, in our estimates, mostly
not significant) impact in poor countries. Given that inequality did
not increase in poor countries, they were constrained in their capac-
ity of accumulating human capital and grow, an implication of the
GZ model stressed by Galor (2011), that we corroborate, also on
the basis of the estimated coefficients on the effect of human capital
on GDP.
Hence, we added two novel elements in the discussion on income
inequality, growth and cross-country convergence: the consideration
of a global factor, such as the world interest rate, and the identi-
fication of a differential role that inequality may play in poor and
rich countries in the process of human capital accumulation, a fun-
damental factor of economic growth.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
From Eqq. (6) and (7), the condition for the existence of the
equilibrium x¯s, i.e. xt+1(xt = h) > h, holds if:
h < ws(1− α), (13)
and the condition for the existence of the equilibrium x¯n, i.e. xt+1(xt =



















F2(r) = β[1− (1− α)(1 + r)]. (17)
Therefore, from Eqq. (5), (13) and (15), the dynamical system in
Eq. (7) shows multiple equilibria if there is a range of values for the
interest rate r such that:
F1(r)
F2(r)
< h < min
{
ws(1− α),




Some calculations show that:
F1(r)
F2(r)
< ws(1− α) <
ws − wn(2 + r)
(1 + r)
(19)











38 M. Battisti ,T. Fioroni and A. M. Lavezzi
if the interest rate is sufficiently low, that is if:
r < r¯ =
αws − 2wn
ws(1− α) + wn
. (20)







Thus Eq. (19) implies that, for each rmin < r < r¯ the interval in
Eq. (18) exists. Therefore when rmin < r < r¯ both Eqq. (13) and
(15) can be satisfied for some values of h, and multiple equilibria
exist.
On the other hand, when r¯ < r < rmax:
ws − wn(2 + r)
(1 + r)




thus the interval in Equation (18) does not exist. Thus from Eq.
(22) and Eq. (5), when r > r¯, it follows that only the condition
h < ws(1 − α) can be satisfied, that is the dynamics only features
the equilibrium x¯n.
Are these conditions satisfied in the period we are observing?
The assumption of this paper is that the period 1985-2005 is char-
acterized by a world interest rate which, starting from high val-
ues, significantly declined over the period, causing the emergence of
poverty traps. A complete set of data needed for a calibration of the
model, however, are not available. For a necessarily partial evalua-
tion of the fulfillment of the conditions stated in this appendix, we
proceeded as follows.
We gathered the available data for the period of interest to proxy
for the variables of the model. In particular, some values for param-
eter α, reflecting the degree of agents’“selfishness”, can be computed
from Nishiyama (2000, Table 10).51 To estimate i we considered the
51Nishiyama (2000) estimated a parameter for parents’ altruism towards future generations
from calibrations based on US data covering different periods between the eighties and the
nineties.
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risk premium variable from the WBI, measuring the difference be-
tween the interest rate on banks’ loans and the (short-term) treasury
bill interest rate.52 The measurement of ws and wn at cross-country
level is made very difficult from the different definitions of skilled
and unskilled wage (see Oostendorp, 2012). The largest compara-
ble dataset, reporting dynamics of wage ratios by skill level only,
is OECD (2007, Table A9.2a), reporting data for the period 1997-
2005 for only 25 countries of our sample (22 rich and 3 poor).53
Alternatively, if we assume to proxy wage levels by skill through in-
come deciles, then UNU-WIDER (2008) contains data for the period
1985-2005 for 35 countries of our sample (17 rich and 18 poor).54
To provide an evaluation of the fulfillment of the conditions of
this appendix, we proceeded as follows. We calculated sample aver-
ages for the available data, averaging in time and across countries,
to obtain a single value for each relevant variable.55 With respect
to the world interest rate, for example, this implies considering an
average value characterizing the whole period.56
The available data provide annual values of some relevant vari-
ables. The model, however, considers variables such as ws, wn, r, i,
that apply to periods amounting to, approximately, half of the life
of generations of individuals. For this reason, we compute “half-
lifetime” values of wages, by cumulating annual wages on a given
52See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.RISK.
53The countries covered are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Por-
tugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Israel (rich); Hungary,
Poland and Turkey (poor). In this case, and in the other that are mentioned in what follows,
not all years are available for each country.
54The countries in this sample are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, United
Kingdom, United States (rich); Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Ghana,
Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland,
Uruguay, Venezuela (poor).
55In the paper, indeed, the implicit assumption is that the parameters of the model hold “on
average” for all countries and across the period, being poor and rich countries classified on the
basis of initial income. In any case, the paucity of data prevents us from carrying out a more
precise analysis, for example distinguishing between different sub-periods or sub-samples within
the interval 1985-2005.
56In other words, we are assuming that the period 1985-2005 is characterized on average by
a “low” world interest rate.
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number of periods by a growth rate taken from the available evi-
dence, and interest rates by simply compounding annual values on
a given number of periods.57
We calibrate the model using the available data. In particular,
we use the following values: i) α = 0.7: this value is consistent with
the values calculated by Nishiyama (2000) for high risk aversion;58.
ii) ra = 0.034, and ia = 0.105: these values for the annual world
interest rate and the interest rate for borrowers are consistent with
the average of the value of the world interest rate used in this paper
for the period 1985-2005 (3.4%), and the average value of the risk
premium computed for the available countries, (7.1%).59. iii) annual
unskilled wage, wna = 6100 and annual skilled wage, wsa = 62000,
respectively growing at annual growth rates equal to gwn = 0.024
and gws = 0.026;
60 iv) the first period of life of unskilled and skilled
workers is assumed to last 15 years, while the second 35 years;61
57Specifically, given an initial annual wage of wa, a growth rate of gwa, and a duration of a
period of life of l years, the half-lifetime wage is computed summing the l + 1 values of annual
wages, where each annual wage is given by wa(1 + gwa)
l. The interest rates appearing in the
model, e.g. r, are instead computed from the following simple formula: (1 + r) = (1 + ra)l,
where ra is the annual value of the interest rate (the same applies to i).
58Nishiyama (2000, Tab. 10), shows that, for high risk aversion, his parameter of parental
altruism per offspring is equal to 0.33. The average number of children in his calibration is
1.35. This returns a value of total parental altruism of 0.45. The interpretation of such number
is that parents care about their children 55% less than they care about themselves. In the
GZ model, α measures the weight of parents’ consumption in utility. A value of α = 0.7 and
1− α = 0.3, therefore, implies that the weight they give to bequests is 45% of the weight they
give to their own consumption.
59This value is computed for 73 out of the 75 countries of our sample (Germany and Taiwan
are missing).
60The values of wna and wsa are calculated as follows: for the countries of our sample present
in the UNU-WIDER (2008) dataset, which contains data on deciles’ income shares for variable
number of years, we assume that the per capita GDP of a year proxies for the average income
of the fifth decile. Using the income shares as weights, we calculate the average income of all
deciles. For each country we calculate the average value of each decile’s average income in time.
The values of wna and wsa correspond to the cross-section averages of the latter values, for the
first and tenth decile, while the values of gwn and gws correspond to the average yearly growth
rate over the available years of the income of the first and tenth decile. The latter values are
rather high, which can be explained, in addition to the small number of countries considered,
by the relatively short period on which they are actually calculated: the average initial year is
1987 and the average number of years is 13.
61The assumption is that in the first period of life individuals work or acquire education, and
work in the second. The model is silent on such values, so we simply assume that the first
period is shorter than the second because it is the one in which education is acquired.
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the values of wn and ws are calculated considering the duration of
the second period of life, while the values of r and i are calculated
using the duration of the first.62 v) The value of h is calibrated to
be around three times the value of wn.
63
With these assumptions, the conditions in Eqq. (19), (20) and
(21) implying the existence of multiple equilibria in the period 1985-
2005, are satisfied.64 Given the lack of more precise indications
from the model on many important parameters (such as duration of
periods of life), the computed values of some variables such as wn
and ws matter in particular for the definition of the proportions that
should exist so that the conditions of this appendix are satisfied.65
From many numerical simulations, the proportions satisfying the
mentioned conditions are: ws/wn ≈ 10, i/r ≈ 5, h/wn ≈ 3. In
other words, the gap between the skilled and unskilled wage should
be relatively high,66 as well as the gap between i and r.
The numerical value of the threshold defined in Eq. (20) is 1.31,
while the computed value of r is 0.65. Ceteris paribus, a value of
ra greater than 0.057 is sufficient generate a value of r > r¯. As
remarked, a fuller comparison with the period before 1985 is not
possible. Let us just note that the level of the world interest rate in
1984 was 6.68%.67
62In the model, the interest rate on loans applies in the first period only, so we used the same
criterion for the calculation of r.
63This implies that the correct value of h to be taken into account should also include some
of the opportunity costs of education, and not only direct costs. From Figure 1, indeed, it is
clear that the scale of h should correspond to the one of wn and ws which, as remarked, should
have the scale of lifetime earnings.
64The condition in Eq. (5), and Assumptions 1 and 2 are also satisfied, so that the computed
values of the three equilibria x¯n, x¯s and g have coherent values.
65The computed values of the wages are: wn = 342754.6, and ws=3623293.
66Proxing wage differentials by deciles’ average income levels seems therefore more appro-
priate than using wage ratios as defined by education levels only, as those in Eurostat (2007)
which are much more narrower (i.e. around 2 averaging across rich and poor countries). Robbins
(1999) report some values for some developing countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Uruguay) suggesting that in the latter this ratio can be
much higher, reaching values of about 6 or 8 between 1980 and 1995
67The average value of the world interest rate between 1981 and 1985, i.e. between the
end of the turbulences caused by the oil shocks and the beginning of our period, was 5.43%.
The average value of similar periods, i.e. 1982-1985 and 1982-1986, was 6.20% and 6.08%.
Comparing two periods of equal length, i.e. 1981-1992 and 1993-2005, we have that the average
world interest rate decreased from 4.93% to 2.68%.
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B Multiple equilibria before and after the fall of world
interest rate and changes in the wage gap
In Appendix A we provided a numerical evaluation of the condi-
tions for the existence of multiple equilibria. Given the caveats of
such an analysis, in this section we consider the consequences of a
reduction in r in the case the dynamics is characterized by multiple
equilibria also in the initial state, to derive the empirically testable
implications.
That is, we assume that initially, rmin < r < r¯. In this case
if, ceteris paribus, the interest rate decreases, from Eqq. (8) and
(10) we obtain that the levels of both the low and high equilibrium











(1− α)[ws(1− α)− h]





(1− α)β(β − 1)[ws(1− α)− h]
[β(1 + r)(1− α)− (β − 1)]2
> 0. (25)
Thus, as shown in Figure 12, a reduction of the interest rate
has the following consequences: it reduces the long-run values of
both x¯n and x¯s, but it increases the basin of attraction of x¯s, as g
decreases. This increases the potential share of skilled workers that
a country could accumulate. That is, if the initial distribution, i.e.
the distribution existing when r decreases, features a positive mass
to the right of g′ (as in Figure 12), than the long-run share of skilled
workers and of aggregate output is predicted to increase following
a decrease in r.









Figure 12: Income Distribution
Thus, a decrease in r should favor initially rich countries by in-
creasing the share of skilled workers they can potentially accumulate
in the long run. The convergence, however, should occur towards a
lower level of x¯s, making the overall effect ambiguous.
68 By increas-
ing the basin of attraction of x¯s, however, it makes more likely that
inequality in rich countries decreases: a fact that we did not find in
the data.
In addition, we can show that a reduction in r also reduces the
difference between x¯s and x¯n, given by:
x¯s − x¯n =
(1− α)[ws − h(1 + r)− wn(2 + r)]
1− (1− α)(1 + r)
. (26)
The derivative of this difference with respect to r is, in fact, positive,
68Galor and Zeira (1993, p. 42) show that the long-run level of average wealth (see Footnote
10 for a discussion of the use of wealth in income in the GZ model) increases with x¯t and with
the share of skilled workers.





[ws(1− α)− h− wn(2− α)]
[1− (1− α)(1 + r)]2
> 0, (27)
if:
h < ws(1− α)− wn(2− α), (28)
which is true if Eq.(5) holds when r = rmax.
Hence, a reduction in r should reduce, ceteris paribus, the long-
run difference between poor and rich countries, considering that x¯n
and x¯s affect the long-run GDP levels. This fact does not seem
to appear in the data but we might have not considered another
important factor.69
That is, we have not considered so far a change in the wage ratio.
It is a well-known fact that, in the period we are considering, the
wage of skilled workers increased with respect to the wage of the un-
skilled, in particular because of skill-biased technological change.70
This change in the parameters may affect the dynamics of in-
equality and growth in the GZ model.71 In particular, for a given
level of r and wn, if ws increases the unstable equilibrium g decreases




When both factors are present, i.e. when the interest rate de-
creases (dr < 0) and the skilled wage rises (dws > 0), the equilib-




The value of the equilibrium x¯s, instead, increases if the variation
of ws is particularly strong, i.e. if the following condition holds:
dws > −
(1− α)ws − h
1− (1− α)(1 + r)
dr (29)
69With the numerical values considered in Appendix A, the condition in Eq. (28) is actually
violated.
70For example, Berman et al. (1998) show that in developed countries, in the period 1979-
1993, the wage gap increases on average of 4.2 (table II p. 1259), while Feenstra and Hanson
(2001) show that in the US in the period 1979-1995 the wage skill gap increased of more than
20 percentage points. Differently, Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) found substantial stability
in skill differentials in rich countries, a reduction in low-income countries, and an increase in
low/middle income and transitions countries.
71Using the data in UNU-WIDER (2008) we find that for the US, for example, the ratio of
the tenth over the first Household disposable income group share rose from to 14.79 to 16.03
from 1986 to 2000, that is a period close to the one analyzed in this paper. On the other hand,
in a country such as Bolivia this ratio fell from 29.1 to 23.4 between 1993 to 2004.
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Therefore, if we add to the overall picture a “relevant” increase
in ws, we obtain that the equilibrium x¯s may shift to the right,
increasing the difference between rich and poor countries and, in
particular, implying a positive effect on the long-run level of GDP
for rich countries, both pieces of evidence that we find in the data.72
The main empirical implication of this scenario, therefore, which
does not seem corroborated by the data is the decrease in inequality
in rich countries.
C Large Sample
In Figures 13 and 14 we show the distribution dynamics and
the estimated stochastic kernel for a larger sample of 158 countries
for the period 1985-2005, while in Figures 15 and 16 we present
the same analysis for the period 1970-1985 (the country list is in
Appendix E).



















Figure 13: Distribution dynamics of
per capita GDP: 1985-2005. 158
countries




















































Figure 14: Stochastic Kernel: 1985-
2005, 158 countries, τ = 21. Thick
line: median of the stochastic kernel;
dotted lines: 95% confidence bands.
72With the numerical values considered in Appendix A, considering a value of dr of three
percentage points (see Footnote 67), the ratio of the right-hand side of Eq. (29) to ws (as
computed in Appendix A) is 0.024. In other words,Eq. (29) is satisfied for a relatively small
increase in ws.
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Figure 15: Distribution dynamics of
per capita GDP: 1970-1985. 158
countries

































































Figure 16: Stochastic Kernel: 1970-
1985, 158 countries, τ = 16. Thick
line: median of the stochastic kernel;
dotted lines: 95% confidence bands.
It can be observed that, in line with the results of Section IV.A.,
there appears a stronger tendency for polarization in the period
1985-2005.
D World Interest Rates and Distribution Dynamics: 1970-
1985
In this appendix we present the empirical evidence on world inter-
est rate and the world income distribution dynamics for the period
1970-1985. We select a shorter period than the one studied in the
paper in order to preserve the same dimension of the sample.
Figure 17 shows the dynamics of the world interest rate and the
US interest rate. As predictable, the oil shocks introduce strong
instability in the time series.
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world (black) and US (red) interest rate: 1970−1985
Figure 17: World and US interest rates 1970-1985
Figure 6 show the distribution dynamics. The appears a ten-
dency for polarization, albeit not as strong as the one characterizing
the period 1985-2005, presented in Figure 6.

















Figure 18: Distribution dynamics
of per capita GDP: 1970-1985. 75
countries



















































Figure 19: Stochastic Kernel: 1970-
1985. 75 countries
Figure 19, finally, presents the estimated stochastic kernel. It
can be observed that the tendency for polarization, highlighted by
the curvature of the median of the kernel and of the the distance
between the median, the 45◦ degree line and the confidence interval,
is less evident and significant that the one found for the period 1985-
2005 (see Figure 7).
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E Country Lists
In Table 6 we report the list of the countries in the main sample
analyzed in this paper, with the adopted classification in poor or
rich. In Table 7 we report the larger list of countries in the sample
analyzed in the analysis of the distribution dynamics in the periods
1985-2005 and 1970-1985.
Argentina poor Spain rich Jordan poor Philippines poor
Australia rich Ethiopia poor Japan rich Poland poor
Austria rich Finland rich Kenya poor Puerto Rico rich
Belgium rich France rich Korea, Republic of rich Portugal rich
Bulgaria poor United Kingdom rich Lesotho poor Singapore rich
Bahamas rich Germany rich Luxembourg rich Sierra Leone poor
Bolivia poor Ghana poor Morocco poor El Salvador poor
Brazil poor Greece rich Madagascar poor Sweden rich
Botswana poor Guatemala poor Mexico poor Thailand poor
Canada rich Hong Kong rich Mauritius poor Trinidad and Tobago rich
Switzerland rich Honduras poor Malawi poor Tunisia poor
Chile poor Hungary poor Malaysia poor Turkey poor
China poor Indonesia poor Nigeria poor Taiwan rich
Colombia poor India poor Netherlands rich Uruguay poor
Costa Rica poor Ireland rich Norway rich United States rich
Denmark rich Iran poor New Zealand rich Venezuela poor
Dominican Republic poor Israel rich Pakistan poor South Africa poor
Ecuador poor Italy rich Panama poor Zambia poor
Egypt poor Jamaica poor Peru poor
Table 6: Country list, 75 countries
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Afghanistan Denmark Lao Rwanda
Albania Djibouti Lebanon Samoa
Algeria Dominica Lesotho Sao Tome and Principe
Angola Dominican Republic Liberia Senegal
Antigua and Barbuda Ecuador Luxembourg Seychelles
Argentina Egypt Macao Sierra Leone
Australia El Salvador Madagascar Singapore
Austria Equatorial Guinea Malawi Solomon Islands
Bahamas Ethiopia Malaysia Somalia
Bahrain Fiji Maldives South Africa
Bangladesh Finland Mali Spain
Barbados France Malta Sri Lanka
Belgium Gabon Marshall Islands St. Kitts & Nevis
Belize Gambia Mauritania St. Lucia
Benin Germany Mauritius St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Bermuda Ghana Mexico Sudan
Bhutan Greece Micronesia. Fed. Sts. Suriname
Bolivia Grenada Mongolia Swaziland
Botswana Guatemala Morocco Sweden
Brazil Guinea Mozambique Switzerland
Brunei Guinea-Bissau Namibia Syria
Bulgaria Guyana Nepal Taiwan
Burkina Faso Haiti Netherlands Tanzania
Burundi Honduras New Zealand Thailand
Cambodia Hong Kong Nicaragua Togo
Cameroon Hungary Niger Tonga
Canada Iceland Nigeria Trinidad and Tobago
Cape Verde India Norway Tunisia
Central African Republic Indonesia Oman Turkey
Chad Iran Pakistan Uganda
Chile Iraq Palau United Kingdom
China Ireland Panama United States
Colombia Israel Papua New Guinea Uruguay
Comoros Italy Paraguay Vanuatu
Congo, Democratic Republic of Jamaica Peru Venezuela
Congo, Republic of Japan Philippines Viet Nam
Costa Rica Jordan Poland Zambia
Cote d‘Ivoire Kenya Portugal Zimbabwe
Cuba Kiribati Puerto Rico -
Cyprus Korea, Republic of Romania -
Table 7: Country list, 158 countries
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